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1. Introduction
Some philosophers recently have developed hybrid meta-ethical theories by merging
elements of both expressivism and cognitivism. 1 Such hybrid theorists combine the
expressivist thesis that moral utterances are neither true nor false because they are used to
express attitudes with the cognitivist thesis that moral utterances are true or false because
they are used to express beliefs. Hybrid theories advanced so far in the literature typically
include success-theoretic rather than error-theoretic versions of cognitivism. Current
hybrid theorists hold both that moral utterances are used to express attitudes and beliefs,
and that some of these expressed beliefs are true. However, philosophers should also
consider a hybrid theory that includes elements of both moral expressivism and moral
error theory. Although such a hybrid expressivist-error theory has not previously been
presented or defended in the literature, it is theoretically preferable to both pure error
theory and pure expressivism. Accepting such a hybrid theory has two advantages over
pure expressivism, because hybrid theorists both can more plausibly explain certain
aspects of moral discourse and can avoid the Frege-Geach problem. Accepting such a
hybrid expressivist-error theory has three advantages over pure error theory, because
hybrid theorists can more plausibly explain certain aspects of moral discourse, they can
less controversially account for moral motivation, and they do not implausibly treat all of
1
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moral discourse as deeply mistaken. Accordingly, such a hybrid theory should be more
attractive to philosophers who are skeptical about success-theoretic cognitivism than
either pure expressivism or pure error theory.
Let us suppose that an individual is deeply skeptical about moral facts and moral
truth. Such a person should thereby be deeply skeptical about moral realism and moral
constructivism, because accepting either theory commits her to holding that some moral
utterances and judgments are true in virtue of moral facts. Nor will such a skeptic be
satisfied with recent hybrid meta-ethical theories that include elements of both
expressivism and success-theoretic cognitivism, since this implies accepting moral truth
and facts. Traditionally, philosophers who are skeptical about moral facts have turned to
moral expressivism or moral error theory. Proponents of both these theories agree that no
moral utterance is true, although they adopt this view for different reasons. Expressivists
hold that moral utterances are not used to describe putative moral facts but rather are used
to express attitudes of the speaker. 2 On their view, there is no true moral utterance
because every moral utterance is neither true nor false. Conversely, error theorists hold
that moral utterances are used to describe putative moral facts but that there are no moral
facts. 3 On their view, since moral utterances are used to express beliefs about entities,
properties, or relations that do not exist, there is no true moral utterance because, as John
Mackie puts it, moral utterances are “all false.” 4 Accordingly, expressivists and error
theorists agree that there are no moral facts, but they disagree about the nature of moral
utterance and judgment. Each theory is plausible in some respects, but expressivists and
error theorists both face problems of their own. Accordingly, philosophers who are both
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skeptical about moral truth and unsatisfied with expressivism or error theory should
consider a neglected alternative, a hybrid of expressivism and error theory.
Such a hybrid expressivist-error theorist treats every moral utterance as either an
expression of a speaker’s attitude or an expression of a false belief. For the sake of
simplicity, let us assume that any moral utterance is used to express either an attitude or a
belief, leaving aside the interesting question of whether a single moral utterance can be
used to express both an attitude and a belief. According to a hybrid theorist, some but not
all moral utterances are used to express the attitudes of speakers, and all such utterances
are neither true nor false; some but not all moral utterances are used to express the beliefs
of speakers, and all such beliefs are false; and no moral utterance is used to express a true
belief of a speaker. An expressivist-error theorist thus holds that there are no moral facts
that could make moral utterances true, but she allows that some moral utterances are used
to express attitudes that are neither true nor false. Like pure expressivists, a hybrid
theorist holds that some moral utterances are used express attitudes of the speaker. Like
pure error theorists, a hybrid theorist holds that some moral utterances are used to express
false beliefs about putative moral facts. Like both expressivists and error theorists, a
hybrid theorist rejects the existence of moral facts and thus denies that any moral
utterance is true.
A hybrid expressivist-error theory is more plausible than either pure expressivism
or pure error theory, because an expressivist-error theorist can avoid at least two
difficulties with pure expressivism and at least three difficulties with pure error theory.
First, pure expressivists have trouble accounting for the fact that some moral utterances
seem to be used to express beliefs of speakers rather than attitudes of speakers. Second,
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pure expressivists must adopt theoretically complex measures in order to solve the FregeGeach problem. Third, pure error theorists have difficulty accounting for the fact that
some moral utterances seem to be used to express attitudes of speakers rather than beliefs
about putative moral facts. Fourth, pure error theorists can account for moral motivation
only by appealing to the controversial claim that beliefs can motivate action. Fifth,
accepting pure error theory has the implausible result of attributing systematic error to all
of moral discourse. Accepting a hybrid expressivist-error theory alleviates all five of
these difficulties. Since it has these advantages over both pure expressivism and pure
error theory, such a hybrid theory should be considered seriously by philosophers who
are skeptical about moral truth and moral facts.

2. Moral Utterances as Expressions Beliefs
Taking the first difficulty with pure expressivism, some moral utterances seem to be used
to express beliefs rather than attitudes. For example, if a speaker says, “It is true that
murder is wrong,” and all evidence suggests that the speaker is being sincere, then it
seems that the moral utterance is used to express a belief in the proposition that murder is
wrong. Pure expressivists claim that appearances are misleading in this case and that the
utterance really is used to express only an attitude of the speaker, such as the speaker's
disapproval of murder. However, this claim is implausible. As Russ Shafer-Landau
argues, the speaker’s moral utterance has the grammatical form of an assertion. 5
Furthermore, the speaker attributes truth to the utterance, and the available evidence
suggests that the speaker is sincere. If the speaker in this example is actually expressing
an attitude and not a belief, it is very strange that he does so via an utterance that, given
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its grammar and the other contextual evidence, very much looks like an expression of
belief. Accordingly, it is more plausible to treat this moral utterance as an expression of a
belief rather than an expression of an attitude. Since speakers commonly do make
utterances of this sort, pure expressivists must give an implausible interpretation of such
aspects of moral discourse.
This consideration does not serve to refute pure expressivism but only indicates a
disadvantage for the pure expressivist with respect to her cognitivist rivals. While it is
possible that the utterance, “It is true that murder is wrong,” is actually an expression of
an attitude in disguise, it is surely more plausible to interpret it according to cognitivist
lights. Expressivist-error theorists can do just this, taking such moral utterances at face
value and treating them as expressions of beliefs. Although hybrid theorists reject that
any such moral belief is true, they can accept that some moral utterances nonetheless are
used to express false beliefs, and this allows them to give a more plausible account of
moral utterances that seem to be cognitivist in nature. Since this option is available for an
expressivist-error theorist but not for a pure expressivist, a hybrid theory is more
plausible than pure expressivism in this respect. All else being equal, this provides
grounds to accept a hybrid theory over pure expressivism. It is important to stress,
however, that such a hybrid theory treats only some moral utterances as expressions of
false beliefs. Expressivist-error theory is thus distinct from pure error theory, whose
proponents treat all moral utterances as expressions of false beliefs.
Pure expressivists could attempt to alleviate this first difficulty with pure
expressivism by appealing to a minimalist account of truth. On this account, truth is not a
substantive property of utterances because there is nothing more to truth than the schema,
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“p” is true if and only if p. 6 Hence, pure expressivists might explain the assertoric
grammar and truth-predication of various moral utterances via minimalist lights, such that
an expressivist interpretation is more plausible. For example, Simon Blackburn writes
that “minimalism about truth allows us to end up saying ‘It is true that kindness is good’.
For this means no more than that kindness is good, an attitude we may properly want to
express.” 7 Since minimalists hold that the truth-predication in this utterance adds nothing
to the expression of an attitude in favor of kindness, minimalists can hold consistently
that the utterance is used to express an attitude rather than a belief. It is likewise with the
utterance, “It is true that murder is wrong,” which minimalist expressivists can interpret
as being used to express nothing more than a disapproving attitude of murder.
There are, however, at least two disadvantages to this minimalist approach. First,
it will be acceptable only to philosophers who also accept a minimalist account of truth,
to which there are a variety of objections. 8 Since proponents of a hybrid expressivisterror theory can but need not accept minimalism, such a hybrid theory is a viable option
for philosophers who do not accept minimalism, whereas minimalist expressivism is not
a viable option for them. There is nothing about a hybrid expressivist-error theory that
requires its proponents either to accept or to reject minimalism. Such a hybrid theory is
consistent with either position. Hence, expressivist-error theorists can appeal to a wider
spectrum of philosophers than minimalist expressivists. This is not a refutation of
minimalist expressivism, since it might be the case that philosophers should accept
minimalism. However, minimalist expressivists have the disadvantage of succeeding or
failing along with minimalists about truth, whereas expressivist-error theory can be
attractive both to philosophers who accept and do not accept minimalism.
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The second disadvantage for minimalist expressivists is that, even if the
objections to minimalism in general can be answered, they still face what James Dreier
calls the problem of creeping minimalism, or the danger that minimalist expressivism
will prove indistinguishable from its cognitivist rivals. 9 This is because minimalism about
truth seems to lead to minimalism about belief. Dreier writes, “Any state of mind
expressed by a declarative sentence, S, automatically, minimalistically counts as a belief
that S. There needn’t be much of anything that ties together all of the states called
‘belief’, nothing over and above their being those states expressed by declarative
sentences.” 10 For example, if an expressivist holds that the moral utterance, “Murder is
wrong,” is true in a minimalistic sense, it is difficult to see how he can avoid holding that
the speaker also believes that murder is wrong in a minimalistic sense. However, if an
expressivist accepts that moral utterances are used to express beliefs, then the distinction
between expressivism and cognitivism seems to be effaced, since in that case
expressivists will accept the central cognitivist thesis that moral utterances are
expressions of beliefs.
A hybrid expressivist-error theorist has the advantage of being able to preserve
the distinction between expressivism and cognitivism, because she can treat some moral
utterances as expressions of attitudes rather than beliefs while treating other moral
utterances as expressions of beliefs rather than attitudes. Although such a hybrid theorist
combines elements of both expressivist and cognitivist theories, she recognizes a
distinction between expressions of beliefs and expressions of attitudes. This allows
hybrid theorists to avoid the problem of creeping minimalism, because they need not treat
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expressions of attitudes as minimalistic beliefs. Hence, all else being equal, a hybrid
expressivist-error theory is theoretically preferable to minimalist expressivism.

3. The Frege-Geach Problem
Second, an expressivist-error theorist can deal with the Frege-Geach problem in a simpler
fashion than a pure expressivist. 11 Let us consider Peter Geach’s example of what he calls
moral reasoning: “If doing a thing is bad, getting your little brother to do it is bad.
Tormenting the cat is bad. Ergo, getting your little brother to torment the cat is bad.” 12
This seems to be a valid modus ponens argument in which the third utterance follows
from the first two. If an individual sincerely presents this argument, she seems to be using
moral utterances to express beliefs about two propositions whose truth would logically
guarantee the truth of a third proposition. Furthermore, in keeping with a thesis first
presented by Gottlob Frege that the meaning of an utterance is the same in both asserted
and unasserted contexts, all three utterances seem to be used to express propositions even
if the speaker is not using the utterances assertorically. 13 For example, even if an actor in
a play sequentially speaks these three utterances, the first two nonetheless seem to be
expressions of propositions, and the third utterance seems to be an expression of a
proposition that is logically entailed by the first two. However, if pure expressivism is
true, the utterances in Geach’s example are not expressions of beliefs in propositions.
Accordingly, these utterances cannot figure as premises in a valid argument in classical
logic and hence cannot guarantee the truth of the conclusion, because none of the
utterances has a truth value. But Geach’s example nonetheless seems to be a valid
argument. The problem for pure expressivists is to explain how valid moral reasoning
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seems to occur despite the fact that moral utterances are not used to express beliefs about
propositions.
One option is to deny that Geach’s example and others like it really are cases of
valid moral reasoning. According to this strategy, the third utterance in Geach’s example
does not follow from the first two. This is because no moral utterance is used to express a
belief about a proposition, and only an utterance that is used to express a belief about a
proposition can serve as a component of a valid argument. Instead, each of these moral
utterances is used to express an attitude, and none of them has any logical relation to the
others. But this extreme strategy has the implausible result that someone can hold the
attitudes that the first two utterances in Geach’s example are used to express without
thereby having a reason to hold the attitude that the third utterance is used to express.
Accordingly, someone can disapprove of getting her brother to do something of which
she disapproves, and she can disapprove of tormenting the cat, yet not have a reason to
disapprove of getting her brother to torment the cat. Few expressivists are willing to
accept this result, because it seems that the disapproval that the third utterance is used to
express follows from the disapproval that the first two utterances are used to express.
Another option for expressivists to deal with apparent examples of valid moral
reasoning is to develop alternative logics that permit inferences between attitudes rather
than propositions. Expressivists such as Blackburn have pursued this strategy, developing
a logic of attitudes that mimics logics of propositions. 14 Blackburn argues that being
consistent requires an individual to hold certain attitudes in virtue of other attitudes he
also holds. 15 According to this account, some attitudes follow from others in the sense
that it would be inconsistent to fail to hold some attitudes given others. Reconsidering
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Geach’s example, the moral utterance, “If doing a thing is bad, getting your little brother
to do it is bad,” is used to express disapproval of getting a person’s own brother to do
something of which that person disapproves. The moral utterance, “Tormenting the cat is
bad,” is used to express disapproval of tormenting the cat. If a person holds all the
attitudes just enumerated, then disapproval of getting that person’s own brother to
torment the cat follows from the other attitudes. The moral utterance, “Hence, getting
your little brother to torment the cat is bad” is used to express this conclusion. According
to Blackburn, being consistent requires a person to hold this last attitude in virtue of the
other attitudes she already holds. If a person disapproves of making her brother do
something of which she disapproves, and if she disapproves of tormenting the cat, then
by consistency she should also disapprove of making her brother torment the cat. Hence,
according to Blackburn’s account, the attitude that the third utterance is used to express
in a sense follows from the attitudes that the first two utterances are used to express.
Such a logic of attitudes might account for cases of moral reasoning that seem
valid, but it is simpler to treat such cases as the logically valid arguments they appear to
be. Hybrid expressivist-error theorists are able to do this by treating some but not all
moral utterances as expressions of beliefs in propositions, such as those in Geach’s
example. Such a hybrid theory thus provides a simpler account of moral reasoning by
treating Geach’s example as a valid argument composed of propositions. Each of the
moral utterances in this example is used to express a belief in a proposition, and it is
impossible for the first two propositions to be true while the third proposition is false. As
a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, Blackburn’s account is more theoretically
complex than a hybrid expressivist-error theory, because his account treats the utterances

11

in Geach’s example as covert expressions of attitudes, despite the fact that they appear to
be expressions of beliefs that function in a valid modus ponens argument. This
consideration does not serve to refute Blackburn’s logic of attitudes as an account of
apparently valid moral reasoning. Indeed, Blackburn himself is unconvinced by this
consideration. 16 Nonetheless, it does serve to show that expressivist-error theory is
preferable on this score. Proponents of expressivist-error theory simply can accept the
apparent validity of some cases of moral reasoning and thus avoid the Frege-Geach
problem in the first place. All else being equal, this is a reason to prefer the expressivisterror theory.

4. Moral Utterances as Expressions of Attitudes
The first advantage of a hybrid expressivist-error theory over pure error theory is that
pure error theorists treat all moral utterances as expressions of false beliefs and thus have
difficulty accounting for moral utterances that seem to be used to express attitudes rather
than beliefs. Let us consider a relative of a solider killed in a military conflict who
sincerely shouts at a war protest, “Down with war!” This moral utterance seems to be
used to express disapproval of war rather than any belief about war, both because the
utterance has the grammatical form of an imperative rather than an assertion and because
the utterance is spoken sincerely by someone who has an especially strong reason to
disapprove of war. Since expressions of attitudes are neither true nor false, this is a
counter-example to the pure error theorist’s thesis that all moral utterances are used to
express false beliefs. To retain their thesis, pure error theorists must claim implausibly
that appearances are misleading in this case and that “Down with war!” really is used to
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expresses a belief, for example that war is wrong. This is implausible because the
grammar of the utterance and the contextual evidence suggest that the utterance is used to
express a disapproving attitude toward war rather than a belief.
However, just as pure expressivism is not refuted by appealing to utterances that
seem to be used to express beliefs, pure error theory is not refuted by appealing to
utterances that seem to be used to express attitudes. The point is simply that the pure
error theorist is at a disadvantage relative to his expressivist competitors when it comes to
accounting for utterances like “Down with war,” because a pure error theorist must
interpret such utterances implausibly as expressions of false beliefs. An expressivist-error
theorist can avoid this implausibility by allowing that such moral utterances are neither
true nor false, because they are used to express attitudes rather than beliefs. Accordingly,
a hybrid theory is more plausible than pure error theory on this score. All else being
equal, this provides grounds to accept a hybrid theory over pure error theory.
A potential objection is that pure error theorists need not concur with Mackie that
all moral utterances are used to express false beliefs. 17 Instead, an error theorist could
hold both that some but not all moral utterances are used to express false beliefs and that
no moral utterance is used to express a true belief. Given this formulation, an error
theorist can eschew the implausible cognitivist interpretation of “Down with war!” as an
expression of a belief. Yet this would leave many moral utterances unexplained because
it would not offer an interpretation of moral utterances that do not seem to be used to
express beliefs. If an error theorist is not to ignore such moral utterances, and if he is not
to treat them implausibly as disguised expressions of beliefs, then he must offer some
account of them that is not purely cognitivist. Error theorists typically do not offer this
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account, but a hybrid theorist can do so by offering an expressivist interpretation of any
moral utterance that does not seem to express a belief. Hence, even granting that error
theorists could avoid holding that all moral utterances are used to express false beliefs,
hybrid theorists still have the advantage of offering an account of the moral utterances
that do not fit well into a cognitivist interpretation.

5. Moral Motivation
The second advantage of a hybrid expressivist-error theory is that, like cognitivists in
general, pure error theorists have difficulty accounting for moral motivation. It is not
immediately clear how beliefs can motivate agents to act in the way that moral judgments
do. While it is obvious that attitudes can be motivational, it is not obvious that beliefs can
be motivational. Accordingly, following Hume, expressivists can argue that their theory
easily explains the fact that agents are at least sometimes motivated by their moral
judgments, since these judgments are used to express attitudes and thus are tied to an
individuals desires about how to act. 18 Since pure error theorists hold that sincere moral
judgments and utterances are used to express false beliefs, they must explain how such
beliefs can motivate agents to act. Since it is much less clear that beliefs can motivate
someone to act than that attitudes can motivate someone to act, pure expressivists have an
easier time explaining the evident fact that moral judgments are at least sometimes
motivational, which makes expressivism theoretically preferable to error theory on this
point.
Hybrid expressivist-error theorists can follow the pure expressivist in this regard,
treating moral judgments that motivate agents to act as attitudes rather than beliefs and
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treating any accompanying moral utterances as expressions of attitudes rather than
expressions of beliefs. Unlike pure error theorists and cognitivists in general, proponents
of a hybrid theory need not meet the difficult challenge of showing that beliefs can
motivate individuals to act, since hybrid theorists can treat all motivating moral
judgments as attitudes. This does not refute pure error theory, but it does show that
expressivist-error theory is theoretically preferable on this point. All else being equal, this
is a reason to prefer a hybrid theory over pure error theory.
A potential objection to this argument is that cognitivists can offer convincing,
anti-Humean arguments that beliefs can motivate agents to act. Shafer-Landau holds that
anti-Humeanism about motivation has a “phenomenological appeal” in the case of an
individual who acts while mistakenly believing she has a certain desire. He uses the
example of a person who believes she attends law school because she desires to be a
lawyer but later discovers that she never in fact desired to be a lawyer. 19 This individual’s
motivation to attend law school cannot be explained by her desire to be a lawyer, since
she actually lacked this desire all along. Shafer-Landau concludes, “The natural, and
simplest, explanation of these sorts of situations is that mistaken beliefs alone are doing
the motivating work.” 20 On this account, an individual can act on the basis of a mistaken
belief that she has a certain desire, which implies that beliefs can motivate. If this is
correct, then perhaps cognitivists can account for moral motivation in terms of beliefs
rather than attitudes.
However, Shafer-Landau also notes that proponents of motivational Humeanism
always can claim that agents in such examples are motivated to act because they care
about something, where such caring is understood in terms of the attitudes of the agent.
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For example, an individual might attend law school while mistakenly believing she
desires to be a lawyer, but her motivation is not that mistaken belief but rather consists of
her caring about something, such as the approval of her lawyer parents. Shafer-Landau
attempts to counter this defense of Humeanism by offering a cognitivists interpretation of
caring, but this is a controversial matter. 21
A hybrid expressivist-error theory is attractive on this score, because its
proponents can treat all motivating moral judgments as attitudes. Accordingly, hybrid
theorists need not rely on the controversial claim that moral beliefs can motivate agents to
act. These considerations refute neither success-theoretic nor error-theoretic cognitivism.
However, since the ability of beliefs to motivate action is in question, whereas the ability
of attitudes to motivate action is not in question, an expressivist account of moral
motivation is less controversial than a cognitivist account of moral motivation. All else
being equal, a theory whose proponents account for moral motivation in terms of
attitudes should be attractive to more philosophers than a theory whose proponents
account for moral motivation in terms of beliefs. Thus, at least on this matter, a hybrid
expressivist-error theory seems theoretically preferable to pure error theory.

6. Radical Error
The third difficult with pure error theory is that its proponents must implausibly attribute
widespread error to all of moral discourse. Mackie, who first defended a moral error
theory explicitly, treats all moral utterances as expressions of false beliefs, while the
contemporary error theorist, Richard Joyce, treats all moral utterances as untrue
assertions. 22 On both accounts, moral discourse is radically mistaken. This result is not
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absurd, nor does it count as a refutation of moral error theory. Some entire discourses are
radically mistaken, such as phlogiston discourse. 23 However, it is implausible to hold that
moral discourse is radically mistaken, because it is improbable that a radically mistaken
kind of discourse would endure for millennia among various cultures the way that moral
discourse has. If the purpose of any moral utterance is to be an expression of a true belief
about a putative moral fact, and if every such utterance is false, then every moral
utterance is a failure. If this is the case, then it is odd that moral utterances should
continue to receive such widespread use rather than, like utterances used to express belief
in phlogiston, being recognized as components of a fundamentally failed discourse.
While this oddity does not refute pure error theory, it is a challenge for pure error
theorists to explain how such a fundamentally flawed kind of discourse has been and
continues to be such a widespread feature of human discourse.
Mackie attempts to meet this challenge by appealing to various patterns of
objectification, whereby certain subjective states are mistakenly treated as objective
moral facts. 24 For example, an individual’s belief in some alleged moral fact can be
explained as a projection of her attitudes or desires, where such attitudes or desires are
objectified and believed mistakenly to be mind-independent properties. According to
Mackie, there are understandable motives for these patterns of objectification, such as the
desire for morality to be used to regulate human interactions, sometimes in ways contrary
to the inclinations of individuals. 25 The objectification of subjective states, although it
leads to the expression of false beliefs, grants an appearance of authority to morality and
thus serves a useful social function. This is one way for an error theorist to account for
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why moral discourse should persist so stubbornly despite the fact that it is radically
mistaken.
Alternatively, hybrid expressivist-error theorists do not attribute systematic error
to moral discourse, because they can treat some, perhaps many, moral utterances as
neither true nor false. This is consistent with the error-theoretic component of a hybrid
theory, because hybrid theorists treat only some but not all moral utterances as
expressions of false beliefs. Since some moral utterances are used to express attitudes,
and since attitudes are neither true nor false, such utterances cannot be mistaken. This
serves to vindicate parts of moral discourse. Hence, hybrid theorists need not explain why
a fundamentally flawed discourse receives such widespread adoption. While hybrid
theorists deny that any moral utterances are true and accept that some moral utterances
are false, they allow that some moral utterances succeed in their purpose of being used to
express attitudes. It is easier to understand how such a discourse could be so widespread
and long-lived, since moral utterances sometimes are successful at performing their
function as expressions of attitudes. This is an advantage over pure error theory, whose
proponents must look for additional explanations of why a radically mistaken kind of
discourse should endure. The fact that hybrid theorists need not offer these additional
explanations makes it simpler and thus theoretically preferable to pure error theory.

7. Uniting Expressivism and Error Theory
One qualm with the expressivist-error theory sketched above is that it does not include a
guaranteed procedure to determine which moral utterances are used to express beliefs and
which are used to express attitudes. Some moral utterances clearly seem to do one rather
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than the other, but this is not obvious in every case. For example, the utterance, “Tom
ought not to murder anyone,” might be either an expression of one’s disapproval of Tom
murdering anyone or an expression of the belief that Tom murdering anyone is wrong. In
such cases, it is not obvious whether the utterance should be given an expressivist or
error-theoretic treatment. Perhaps a procedure can be found to delineate clearly whether
an utterance is used to express a belief or an attitude, or perhaps the distinction is
inherently vague. However, the fact that a hybrid theorist cannot determine the nature of
all particular moral utterances is not an objection to that theory itself, because this metaethical theory is meant only to offer a general account the nature of moral utterances.
Furthermore, the question of whether a particular moral utterance in fact is used to
express a belief or an attitude is an empirical issue. Accordingly, inquirers can investigate
the matter empirically, such as by asking questions of a speaker to determine the nature
of his moral utterance and paying attention to contextual evidence that could help
determine whether that utterance is used to express a belief or an attitude.
A second qualm with a hybrid expressivist-error theory is that its proponents do
not solve any problem that is not soluble be either pure error theorists or pure
expressivists. For example, a hybrid theorist deals with the Frege-Geach problem by
appealing to the insights of error theorists, and she explains moral motivation by
appealing to the insights of expressivists. Neither of these solutions is unique to a hybrid
expressivist-error theory. However, the ability of proponents of such a hybrid theory to
countenance the insights of both error theorists and expressivists is unique, and it allows
hybrid theorists to solve more problems than either pure error theorists or pure
expressivists. For example, while pure expressivists can explain moral motivation with
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relative ease, it is more difficult on their theory to deal with the Frege-Geach problem.
Conversely, while pure error theorists can deal with the Frege-Geach problem with
relative ease, it is more difficult on their theory to explain moral motivation. The fact that
hybrid theorists can appeal consistently to both an error-theoretical solution to the FregeGeach problem and an expressivist account of moral motivation, as well as other
elements of both error theory and expressivism, is sufficient to make it a unique and
attractive option for philosophers who are skeptical concerning moral facts and truth.
A third and final qualm with a hybrid expressivist-error theory concerns questions
about its unity. Since hybrid theorists borrow from both pure error theory and pure
expressivism, there is a risk of applying the error-theoretic and expressivist components
of a hybrid theory in an unprincipled fashion, such as by applying whichever component
is convenient in a given case. This would be little better than alternately applying pure
error theory and pure expressivism haphazardly. It is thus reasonable to worry that a
hybrid theory is nothing more than a disjointed aggregation of pure error theory and pure
expressivism rather than a unified theory.
However, the risk of unprincipled application of a hybrid theory’s components
can be avoided by paying attention to the nature of particular moral utterances. A
particular moral utterance requires error-theoretic treatment if and only if that utterance is
used to express a belief. A particular moral utterance requires expressivist treatment if
and only if that utterance is used to express an attitude. Given these two principles, a
hybrid theorist does not haphazardly apply the error-theoretic or expressivist components
of her theory, since which component is appropriate to apply is constrained by the nature
of the moral utterance under consideration. Since such a hybrid theorist recognizes that
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some moral utterances are used to express beliefs whereas other moral utterances are
used to express attitudes, the unity of a hybrid expressivist-error theory is secure by the
principles whereby its error-theoretic and expressivist components are respectively
applied to moral utterances used to express beliefs and moral utterances used to express
attitudes.
An expressivist-error theory is preferable to pure expressivism, because hybrid
theorists can account more plausibly for moral utterances that seem to be used to express
beliefs rather than attitudes, and they can avoid the Frege-Geach problem without
resorting to complex measures. A hybrid theory is preferable to pure error theory,
because hybrid theorists can account more plausibly for moral utterances that seem to be
used to express attitudes rather than beliefs, they can explain moral motivation
straightforwardly in terms of attitudes rather than beliefs, and they avoid attributing
systematic error to the whole of moral discourse. For philosophers who are sympathetic
to the view that no moral utterance is true, expressivist-error theory is more attractive
than either expressivism or error theory on its own. 26
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